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Abstract: According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all (or most) physical properties are dispositional, 
dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. 
Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all (or most) physical properties – in 
order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. 
One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, 
but denies that dispositions require categorical grounds. In this paper, I propose that this challenge can be countered 
by the claim that the only (fundamentally) dispositional properties we know are phenomenal properties, in particular, 
phenomenal properties associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Claims of this sort have been common in 
the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary dispositionalists. I will defend 
a new and updated version of this claim, based on what I call the phenomenal powers view. Combined with other 
premises from the original case for panpsychism – which are not affected by the challenge from dispositionalism – it 
forms an argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism. 
 
1 Introduction 
Panpsychism, the view that all physical entities are associated with phenomenal consciousness, 
has recently seen a revival in philosophy. This has been based on two main arguments. Both 
arguments start from the observation that all (or at least most) physical properties are dispositional. 
They then claim that dispositional properties require categorical grounds or realizers, and that 
phenomenal properties are the only categorical properties we know. This suggests that phenomenal 
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properties could be the categorical realizers of all (or most) physical properties—as per what is 
known as Russellian panpsychism.1  
The two main arguments then offer different reasons for taking this possibility as actual. The first 
main argument—call this the argument from philosophy of mind—claims that it enables a solution 
to the mind–body problem that avoids the main problems of physicalism and dualism at once 
(Strawson 2006; Alter and Nagasawa 2012; Chalmers 2013). Roughly, this is because, unlike 
physicalism, Russellian panpsychism takes phenomenal properties to be fundamental and 
irreducible to physical properties, but unlike dualism, it also offers phenomenal properties an 
explanatorily role in the physical world compatible with physical causal closure. The second main 
argument—call this the argument from anti-noumenalism—claims that Russellian panpsychism 
offers the only positive account of what the categorical grounds of physical dispositions might be, 
and thereby the only way of avoiding noumenalism, the Kantian view that the grounds of the 
physical world are unknowable or inconceivable (Strawson 2006; Seager 2006; Alter and 
Nagasawa 2012).  
One challenge to both arguments comes from dispositionalism (Shoemaker 1980; Ellis 2002; 
Molnar 2003; Mumford 2004; Bird 2007). Dispositionalists agree with panpsychists that all (or 
most) physical properties are dispositional, but deny that they require any categorical grounds or 
realizers. Rather, they take dispositions to be fundamental and irreducible properties—roughly 
equivalent to non-Humean causal powers. This blocks the argument from philosophy of mind, by 
eliminating the need for categorical grounds, and thus the explanatory role that fundamental 
phenomenal properties are supposed to play. It also blocks the argument from anti-noumenalism, 
                                               
1 After Bertrand Russell, who offered an especially clear articulation of it (Russell 1927), even though he ended up 
endorsing neutral monism, a different but closely related view (see footnote 2 below). 
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by implying that noumenalism can be avoided by eliminating categorical properties rather than 
conceiving of them as phenomenal. How can panpsychists respond to this challenge?  
In this paper, I will first consider some of the main arguments that panpsychists have offered in 
defense of categoricalism, i.e., the view that dispositions require categorical grounds or realizers. 
I will conclude that these arguments cannot easily refute the challenge from dispositionalism—
some because they only apply to other forms of non-categoricalism such as ontic structural realism 
(Ladyman and Ross 2007); others simply because they are not fully conclusive.  
I will then propose that the challenge can rather be met by a different response, according to which 
dispositionalism may well be true. But the only fundamentally dispositional properties we know 
or can positively conceive of are phenomenal properties—in particular, phenomenal properties 
associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Versions of this claim have been common in 
the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary 
dispositionalists (and other realists about causal powers). I will defend a new and updated version 
of it. Combined with other premises which are already part of the previous arguments for 
panpsychism—and which are not affected by the challenge  dispositionalism—this forms an 
argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism.2 
                                               
2 Note that Russellian panpsychism, the view that physical properties are realized by phenomenal properties, is a 
subspecies of Russellian monism, the view that physical properties are realized by non-physical properties which could 
be either phenomenal or protophenomenal/neutral (neither physical nor phenomenal). Some find non-panpsychist 
Russellian monism equally (if not more) capable of solving the mind–body problem and accounting for the categorical 
grounds of the physical world as the panpsychist version. But arguably, non-panpsychist Russellian monism comes 
too close to noumenalism to be compatible with the argument from anti-noumenalism, and is too reductive to be 
compatible with the argument from philosophy of mind. I will therefore set non-panpsychist Russellian monism aside 
in this paper. However, those who prefer some form of non-panpsychist Russellian monism to the panpsychist version 
are welcome to read this paper as supporting a response to the challenge from dispositionalism to parallel arguments 
against their view, according to which dispositionalism entails non-panpsychist Russellian monism—because the only 
fundamentally dispositional properties we know or can positively conceive of are neutral/protophenomenal properties 
(and perhaps also phenomenal properties, but they could be dismissed in view of arguments that support non-
panpsychist Russellian monism over panpsychism). However, this would require refuting my arguments below that 
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I will begin by explaining the case for panpsychism from categorical properties in more detail 
(section 2). I will then discuss previous and potential defenses of categoricalism against the 
challenge from dispositionalism (section 3). I will then describe some of the recent and historical 
background for the argument for panpsychism from dispositional properties, before outlining my 
own version of it (section 4). Finally, I will offer a defense of this argument’s central, novel 
premise: that the only fundamentally dispositional properties we know or can positively conceive 
of are phenomenal properties (sections 5 and 6). Claims of this sort have previously been defended 
by appeal to intentional or volitional properties (understood as causes of actions), but this defense 
faces difficult objections. I will therefore offer a different defense of the premise in terms of 
motivational phenomenal properties such as pain and pleasure (understood as causes of volitions), 
which I will argue avoids previous objections. 
This defense will be based on what I have elsewhere called the phenomenal powers view. This is 
the view that phenomenal properties have (a priori knowable) causal powers in virtue of their 
phenomenal character, i.e., in virtue of how they feel (as opposed to in virtue of entering into 
contingent regularities or being governed by external laws). In other work, I have defended this 
view as a response to other problems of mental causation (Mørch 2018), and as part of an argument 
against physicalism (Mørch forthcoming-b). I have also previously examined the history and 
structure of arguments from dispositionalism (or realism about causal powers in general) to 
panpsychism (Mørch forthcoming-a) but here I defend my own version of it.  
                                               
we have no positive concept of non-phenomenal, neutral powers (neither a primitive positive concept nor one that can 
be abstracted away from our experience of phenomenal powers).  
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2 The Case for Panpsychism 
Dispositions are properties that characterize what things do, or properties that are essentially linked 
to the manifestation of particular further properties given particular circumstances or stimuli. For 
example, fragility is dispositional because it manifests as breaking in the circumstance of being 
struck. According to the case for panpsychism, all fundamental physical properties—with some 
possible exceptions such as purely spatiotemporal properties—are like this. Physical properties 
can be defined, roughly, as the kind of properties that can in principle be fully revealed by 
(completed, ideal) physics. 3  And physics seems to reveal dispositions “all the way down” 
(Blackburn 1990). For example, all physics tells us about charge is that it is (roughly) the property 
of repelling entities with identical charge and attracting entities with opposite charge if (i.e., in the 
circumstance that) other charged entities are nearby. Similarly, all it tells us about mass is that it 
is (roughly) the property of resisting acceleration (if a force is present), attracting other massive 
entities, and so on.  
Panpsychists then assert categoricalism: the view that dispositions require categorical grounds or 
realizers. Categorical properties can be defined as non-dispositional properties, or properties that 
are not essentially linked to the manifestation of any further properties. Defenses of categoricalism 
often presuppose that dispositions are purely relational or structural properties. This is based on 
the view that dispositions can be given a conditional analysis of the form “will M if C (given 
appropriate background qualifications 4 )” (Ryle 1949; Lewis 1997), according to which 
                                               
3  In view of problems such as Hempel’s dilemma, physical properties are also often defined negatively as 
(fundamentally) non-mental (see, e.g., Papineau 2001). But given the negative definition, it is not possible to 
distinguish physicalism from non-panpsychist Russellian monism (given that protophenomenal or neutral properties 
are also non-phenomenal and non-mental). I will therefore employ the positive definition in terms of physics, despite 
its problems. 
4 Such as the absence of finks, antidotes and other kinds of interference discussed in the literature (which may not be 
definable in non-dispositional terms, cf. footnote 18 below).  
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dispositions consist in nothing more than relations between manifestations and circumstances. If 
these circumstances and manifestations are also dispositional and thereby relational, the physical 
world would reduce to a set of relations without (non-relational) relata, or a pure structure with no 
(non-structural) realizers. The claim that relations need (non-relational) relata is often put forth as 
self-evident. 
But what could the categorical realizers of physical dispositions be, if physics does not tell us about 
them? Some suggest that these properties are unknowable, perhaps even inconceivable, similar to 
Kantian noumena.5 But according to panpsychists, phenomenal properties, i.e., properties that 
characterize what it is like to be in conscious states, are categorical. For example, consider the 
property of what it is like to see red. This property is associated with a number of dispositions, 
such as the disposition to verbally report seeing red if asked, or the physical dispositions of its 
neural correlate. But redness also has a phenomenal character which does not seem to consist in 
manifesting any further properties—a qualitative being that seems independent of its doing. The 
same seems to hold for other phenomenal properties. This suggests that phenomenal properties 
could be the categorical realizers of all physical properties—with the possible exception of purely 
spatiotemporal, and other relational but arguably non-dispositional, properties6—by constituting 
the relata of all physical relations, as per Russellian panpsychism. 
                                               
5 At least on some readings of Kant, such as Langton (1998).  
6 Some relational properties such as spatiotemporal relations are arguably not purely dispositional, and if so, the 
arguments from categorical properties would not imply that they are phenomenal. This would still be compatible with 
panpsychism insofar as panpsychism primarily requires that all things in space and time are phenomenal, but not that 
space and time itself is phenomenal. More generally, panpsychism can be understood as the view that non-relational 
properties are all phenomenal, but there may also be relational properties that are not phenomenal or phenomenally 
grounded. The kind of panpsychism that allows for some fundamental non-phenomenal relations, such as 
spatiotemporal relations, is known as impure panpsychism. The kind of panpsychism that takes all properties including 
relations to be phenomenal or phenomenally grounded is known as pure panpsychism (Chalmers forthcoming).  
 One might think that if spatiotemporal relations are fundamental, then dispositions can be grounded in purely 
spatiotemporal relations rather than phenomenal properties. But even if spatiotemporal relations are fundamental, they 
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The argument from philosophy of mind then claims that this view enables a solution to the mind-
body problem that avoids the main problems of both physicalism and dualism (Strawson 2006; 
Alter and Nagasawa 2012; Chalmers 2013). The main problem of physicalism is the epistemic gap 
from physical to phenomenal properties (exemplified by, e.g., the knowledge gap (Jackson 1982) 
and the conceivability gap (Kripke 1980; Chalmers 1996)) which arguably should not be present 
if phenomenal properties were reducible to physical properties. Russellian panpsychism avoids 
this problem because it does not take phenomenal properties to be reducible to physical 
properties—rather, it takes physical properties to be (at least partially) reducible to phenomenal 
properties, in being categorically realized by them. The main problem of dualism is the problem 
of mental causation, according to which we have good reason to believe that the physical world is 
causally closed (Kim 1989; Papineau 2001). Therefore, if phenomenal properties are non-physical, 
they cannot causally affect the physical world (except as redundant overdeterminers). Russellian 
panpsychism avoids this problem because it gives phenomenal properties the explanatory role of 
categorically realizing, rather than causally interacting with, physical properties. This role is 
compatible with physical causal closure, and assuming we are not aware of any other kinds of 
categorical properties, phenomenal properties are not excluded from playing it. 
The argument from anti-noumenalism, on the other hand, claims that phenomenal properties 
should be posited as the realizers of physical dispositions wholly independently of the mind–body 
problem, but rather in order to avoid the Kantian view that we have no knowledge or positive 
conception of the properties underlying the physical world (Strawson 2006; Seager 2006; Alter 
and Nagasawa 2012). According to this argument, phenomenal properties are not only the only 
                                               
seem to require relata with non-spatiotemporal properties, otherwise they would not be capable of constituting a non-
empty physical world, or a spacetime that is actually occupied by anything besides empty points or locations. 
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categorical properties we know to exist, they are also the only categorical properties we can 
positively conceive of. A positive conception is a conception that lets the nature of a property be 
grasped or imagined in concrete or substantive detail. It contrasts with a merely negative 
conception that only specifies the metaphysical or theoretical role of a property (and leaves open 
how, or that in virtue of which, the role is played). Rejection of noumenalism is sometimes 
motivated by appeal to simplicity: when possible, we should prefer simple theories, and it is 
simpler to posit one fundamental kind of categorical properties (i.e., only the phenomenal kind) 
than two (i.e., both phenomenal and noumenal kinds) (Goff 2017). But it could also be motivated 
by a purely methodological principle, according to which we should not posit 
unknowable/inconceivable properties to satisfy our explanatory needs when an adequate positive 
alternative is available. This is a principle that we seem to adhere to in most other areas of inquiry, 
and should arguably therefore also apply to the question of categorical grounds (Mørch 
forthcoming-a).7 
Both arguments can of course be challenged in a number of ways,8 but here I will only focus on 
the challenge from dispositionalism. As noted, dispositionalists agree with panpsychists that all 
(or most) physical properties are dispositional, but deny categoricalism, i.e., that dispositional 
properties require categorical realizers or grounds, because they take dispositions to be 
                                               
7 One problem with the appeal to simplicity is that noumenalists may claim that phenomenal properties are reducible 
to noumenal properties, which means that noumenalism also only posits one fundamental kind of categorical property 
and is therefore just as simple. The methodological motivation does not have this problem. 
8 The argument from philosophy of mind is mainly challenged by the combination problem, according to which 
panpsychism may account for how microphenomenal properties can be both fundamental and explanatory with respect 
to the physical world, but fails to account for our own macrophenomenal properties (Goff 2009; Chalmers 2016). The 
argument from anti-noumenalism can be challenged by arguments that we should expect the fundamental nature of 
the world to be unknowable and inconceivable in view of features of our cognitive constitution or overall epistemic 
situation (McGinn 1989), or by claims that we can positively conceive of categorical non-phenomenal properties on 
the basis of imagination, abstraction, or in accordance with primitive concepts (arguments that fundamentally 
dispositional properties can be positively conceived on this basis will be discussed below). Both arguments can also 
be challenged by the claim that phenomenal properties are not really categorical (as per reductive functionalism, 
phenomenal externalism and so on), or the claim that physics actually does tell us about categorical properties.  
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fundamental.  I will now consider whether this challenge can be refuted by arguments that have 
been, or could potentially be, put forth by panpsychists in defense of categoricalism.  
3 Defending Categoricalism 
3.1 The Pythagorean Reductio 
In defense of categoricalism, a number of panpsychists (e.g., Seager 2006; Brüntrup 2011) have 
appealed to arguments against ontic structural realism (Ladyman and Ross 2007). Ontic structural 
realism is the view that all physical properties are purely structural or relational, but that relations 
do not need relata with non-relational properties; rather, physical relations can subsist on their 
own, or at least prior to their relata such that the relata are constituted by their position in a 
relational structure and would have no reality outside of it. 9  Physical objects will thus be 
comparable to nodes in a graph, entities that have no properties except their position in the graph, 
or to numbers, which can arguably be exhaustively described in terms of their relations to other 
numbers.10  
One of the most powerful arguments against ontic structural realism starts out from precisely the 
manner in which it renders physical objects comparable to mathematical objects: the view can be 
charged with collapsing the distinction between the physical and the mathematical, or the concrete 
and the abstract. Van Fraassen (2006) argues that “the difference between mathematical 
(uninstantiated) structure and physical (instantiated) structure cannot itself be explained in purely 
                                               
9 In this way, ontic structural realism avoids Newman’s problem, according to which, unless physical relations have 
some qualitative or non-structural features, knowledge of physical relations reduces to knowledge of the mere 
cardinality of their relata (Demopoulos and Friedman 1985). This problem often comes up in the panpsychist literature 
as a response to various forms of structural realism (e.g., Seager 2006), but it presupposes that relata are prior to 
relations, which ontic structural realism denies (Ladyman and Ross 2007: 128). 
10 According to the structuralist conception of mathematics (Shapiro 1997). 
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structural terms” (as paraphrased in Ladyman and Ross (2007: 158)). If the physical ends up being 
indistinguishable from the mathematical, the result is a kind of Pythagoreanism. For many, this 
would amount to a reductio ad absurdum.  
But even if this or similar arguments against ontic structural realism were successful, it would not 
be sufficient to defend categoricalism against the challenge from dispositionalism. At best, it 
would establish a weaker claim: 
Non-structuralism: All (or most) physical properties are realized by non-structural (i.e., 
non-relational) properties.  
If dispositions were purely structural or relational, as per the conditional analysis, then categorical 
properties would be the only non-structural properties there are, and non-structuralism would 
imply: 
Categoricalism: All (or most) physical properties are realized by categorical properties.  
But unlike ontic structural realists, dispositionalists take dispositions to be fundamental and not 
reducible to either categorical or purely structural properties. Rather, they hold that dispositions 
should be regarded as irreducible, non-Humean powers (or other closely related properties such 
potencies or capacities). These powers have a relational aspect, in the sense that they are 
essentially directed or aimed toward producing their manifestations. For example, the power of 
charge is directed toward the repulsion/attraction of similarly/differently charged entities. But 
powers can also be thought of as characterized by a kind of primitive force or energy (or “oomph”, 
as some have called it) that we may seem to have an intuitive, positive grasp of. This aspect is not 
purely structural or relational, at least not in the sense of being capturable in purely logico-
mathematical terms. The property of instantiating causal power has also traditionally been 
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regarded as a paradigmatic criterion of real, concrete existence (for example by Plato’s Eleatic 
Stranger). Dispositionalism thereby has a clear answer to the question of what distinguishes 
physical from mathematical structure, namely that the former is realized by powers. It is therefore 
not vulnerable to the Pythagorean reductio.  
The view that all physical properties are fundamentally dispositional can be referred to as 
dispositional monism (Shoemaker 1980; Mumford 2004; Bird 2007). A closely related view is 
dispositional essentialism, according to which most physical properties are fundamentally 
dispositional, but some are categorical (Molnar 2003; Ellis 2002). Both these views constitute 
equal challenges to the case of Russellian panpsychism, because those physical properties 
dispositional essentialists tend to regard as categorical are the same properties that Russellian 
panpsychists tend to regard as possibly primitive and non-phenomenal, such as purely 
spatiotemporal properties (see footnote 6 above). For this reason, I will use the term 
dispositionalism to refer to both dispositional monism and dispositional essentialism. 
3.2 Always Packing, Never Travelling 
Other panpsychists (e.g., Goff 2017: 140) have responded to the challenge from dispositionalism 
by appeal to the “always packing, never travelling”-argument, defended by Armstrong (among 
others). According to this argument, a world realized by powers alone would exist merely 
potentially, and not actually: 
Can it be that everything is potency, and act is the mere shifting around of potencies? … Given a purely 
Dispositionalist account of properties, particulars would seem to be always re-packing their bags as they 
change their properties, yet never taking a journey from potency to act. For ‘act’, on this view, is no 
more than a different potency. (Armstrong 1997) 
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Or, as one might paraphrase the objection, the difference between an actual and a merely possible 
physical structure cannot be explained in terms of powers alone.  
However, dispositionalists have responded that this objection conflates potencies and potentials: 
… this view assumes that a power is a potential only and not at all actual in its own right: a power’s 
actuality resides only in its manifestation. … The danger of this view is that it treats powers as nothing 
more than mere potentialities but thereby ignores the obvious point that to be potent (as opposed to 
potential) is to be actual. On a causal criterion of existence … being potent is the mark of being actual. 
Potent means powerful, which is something very different from being potential, meaning not yet actual. 
Those who favour powers regard them as potent rather than potential. Hence, while powers are powers 
to do or be other things, they are also things in their own right. The shifting round of potencies is 
acceptable, therefore, as long as there are actual things doing the shifting. (Mumford 2004: 174) 
The significant difference between potencies and potentials, pointed out by Mumford, is that 
potentials are by definition not actual, whereas potencies (i.e., powers) could be regarded as actual 
without contradiction. Moreover, potency may even imply actuality, in accordance with the causal 
criterion of reality (as also mentioned above). In view of this defense, the “always packing, never 
travelling”-argument does not seem sufficient to refute dispositionalism.  
3.3 Intrinsicalism 
One might think the challenge from dispositionalism could still be refuted in a fairly simple way 
by shifting focus from categorical to intrinsic properties. The case for panpsychism is often 
presented in terms of intrinsic rather than categorical properties. An intrinsic property can be 
defined, roughly, as a property that is not constitutively dependent on the properties of other 
things. 11  Categorical properties are constitutively independent of properties of other things, 
                                               
11 Though see Lewis and Langton (1998) for some further qualifications.  
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including any circumstances and manifestations. Arguments that phenomenal properties are 
categorical would therefore also imply that they are intrinsic. Furthermore, the premise of 
categoricalism could be replaced with the more general premise of:  
 Intrinsicalism: All (or most) physical properties are realized by intrinsic properties.  
One might think intrinsicalism is more easily defensible than categoricalism. Russell claimed that 
eliminating intrinsic properties leads to a vicious ontological regress whereby “all the things in 
the world will merely be each other’s washing” (Russell 1927: 325). It has also been suggested 
that concreteness requires intrinsicality (perhaps because concreteness requires individuality 
which in turn requires intrinsicality). For example, Seager writes:  
If relationalism [i.e., non-intrinsicalism] is true then no entity can exist by itself—all entities 
metaphysically imply the existence of other things, just as it is impossible for a node of a particular 
graph to exist apart from the rest of the graph. However, the evident difference between concrete 
individuals and the merely abstractly specified structures of graph theory (and other mathematical 
constructs) tells against relationalism here. What is concreteness, if not the ability of concrete things to 
exist apart from other things? (Seager 2006: 142) 
But even granted that intrinsicality is required for concreteness or to avoid ontological regress, this 
would be no problem for dispositionalism, because powers can also be regarded as intrinsic.  Given 
the conditional analysis, dispositions would be extrinsic because they are fully constituted by 
relations between external manifestations and circumstances. But when it comes to powers in the 
irreducible sense, it seems possible for them to exist unmanifested (see Molnar 2003). For 
example, it seems that a particle could have the power of charge, understood as involving a 
directedness toward the attraction or repulsion of other possible charged particles, even if it existed 
alone in the universe and this power could thereby never manifest as attraction or repulsion of any 
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other actual charged particles. If this is correct, intrinsicalism is compatible with dispositionalism 
and could not be used to refute it.  
3.4 The Identity View 
Panpsychists could also consider appealing to arguments for the identity view of the categorical 
and the dispositional (Martin and Heil 1999; Strawson 2008). On this view, all properties are 
necessarily both dispositional and categorical, as opposed to purely one or the other.12 It has also 
been characterized as the view that all properties are powerful qualities, as opposed to pure 
qualities or pure powers. If the identity view is correct, dispositionalism entails categoricalism.  
But even if the identity view could thereby save categoricalism, it would not save the overall case 
for panpsychism, because given the identity view, the challenge from dispositionalism to 
categoricalism would simply transform into an equally powerful challenge to the premise that the 
only categorical properties we know or can positively conceive of are phenomenal properties. If 
we have a positive grasp of dispositions as primitive, non-phenomenal powers, and these powers 
are also categorical, as per the identity view, it follows that we have a positive grasp of non-
phenomenal categorical properties after all, contrary to this premise. 
In this way, dispositionalism (including both pure dispositionalism and versions of the identity 
view that allow us to conceive of the categorical via the dispositional) seems to constitute a robust 
                                               
12 I have defined categorical properties as properties that are not essentially linked to the manifestation of any further 
properties and dispositional properties as properties that are essentially linked to the manifestation of further 
properties, given which the identity claim would seem contradictory. But identity view could perhaps be defined as 
the view that the essence of properties partially consists in being directed towards or otherwise linked to the 
manifestation of further properties, but also partially consists in some (at least conceptually) independent aspect or 
component, such as qualitativeness. This would distinguish the identity view from pure categoricalism, which could 
be defined as the view that the essence of properties not even partially consists in being linked to the manifestation of 
further properties, and pure dispositionalism, which could be defined as the view that the essence of properties fully 
and exhaustively consists in being linked to manifestations (and does not even partially consists in any independent 
aspect or component such as qualitativeness).  
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challenge to the arguments for panpsychism from categorical properties, and there is no obvious 
way of defending categoricalism (including both pure categoricalism and versions of the identity 
view that do not allow us to conceive of the categorical via the dispositional) against it. 
4 Does Dispositionalism Entail Panpsychism? 
4.1 Recent and Historical Background 
As we have seen, based on recent literature on panpsychism, panpsychism and dispositionalism 
might seem fundamentally opposed. However, in the literature on dispositionalism and causal 
powers, panpsychism often comes up in a surprisingly different way. Here, many philosophers see 
panpsychism, not as a potential consequence of rejecting dispositionalism in favor of 
categoricalism, but rather as a potential consequence of accepting dispositionalism. That is, 
panpsychism appears as part of an alleged reductio, a (supposedly “disastrous”) consequence of 
accepting dispositionalism, along with realism about causal powers in general—the view that all 
things possess fundamentally dispositional properties, but may also possess categorical properties 
(in addition to those admitted by dispositional essentialists, such as purely spatiotemporal 
properties). 
For example, Madden and Hare write:  
It is most crucial to avoid what we like to call the “inferential predicament,” because getting 
involved in it forces one inevitably into pan-psychism and animism, an unmitigated disaster in the 
eyes of a great majority of contemporary philosophers. … The inferential predicament arises by 
taking volitional contexts as the only ones in which causal power is directly perceived, and then 
projecting such experienced power onto objects and events in order to make sense of causal 
necessities in the physical world. (Madden and Hare 1971: 23) 
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Madden and Hare here claim that we seem to directly perceive causal powers in volitional contexts, 
i.e., when exerting our own efforts in agency. They warn that if these were our only experiences 
of causal power, we must take every instance of causation to involve the mental property of 
volition. 
Martin and Pfeifer express a similar worry in terms of intentionality:  
The most typical characterizations of intentionality … all fail to distinguish intentional mental states 
from non-intentional dispositional physical states. Accepting any of these current accounts will be to 
take a quick road to panpsychism! (Martin and Pfeifer 1986: 531) 
They add that: “for some, this may be a happy result—for us it is a reductio ad absurdum …” 
(1986: 551). Similarly, Armstrong writes:  
Consider, then, the critical case where the disposition is not manifested. The object still has within itself, 
essentially, a reference to the manifestation that did not occur. It points to a thing that does not exist. 
This must remind us of the intentionality of mental states and processes … if irreducible dispositions 
and powers are admitted for physical things, then intentionality, irreducible intentionality, has turned 
up in everything there is. Is this not objectionable? Does it not assimilate the physical to the mental, 
rather than the other way around? (Armstrong 1997: 79, emphasis original) 
Intentionality is the manner in which thoughts and mental states can be about or directed towards 
other things or states, and is regarded by many as a mark of the mental. Armstrong, Martin and 
Pfeifer point out how dispositionality and intentionality seem to share a number of essential 
features, such as directedness, and take this to suggest that everything dispositional is intentional. 
Still, most realists about causal powers hold that panpsychism can be avoided. For example, 
Madden and Hare claim we experience causal power not only in volition but also in the physical 
world, whereas Martin and Pfeiffer offer a new account of intentionality that is not analogous with 
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accounts of dispositionality. Others have accepted the analogy but denied that it entails 
panpsychism. For example, Place (1996) argues that intentionality is not a mark of the mental, but 
rather a mark of the dispositional. Similarly, Molnar (2003: ch. 3) argues that dispositionality is to 
be positively understood as a kind of “physical intentionality”.  
No contemporary panpsychists seem to have taken up the opportunity to defend panpsychism on 
the same basis, i.e., by defending both the analogy and the entailment. But historically, a number 
of panpsychists have made arguments of this kind (see Mørch forthcoming-a for details). For 
example, Leibniz repeatedly made claims such as: 
The clearest idea of active power comes to us from the mind. So active power occurs only in things 
which are analogous to minds … (Leibniz 1704/1981: 171) 
Leibniz also held that everything fundamentally real has active power, from which it follows that 
everything fundamentally real is mindlike, as per his monadology.  
William James also suggests (and later explicitly endorses (1912)) a similar argument: 
… the concrete perceptual flux, taken just as it comes, offers in our own activity-situations perfectly 
comprehensible instances of causal agency ... If we took these experiences as the type of what actual 
causation is, we should have to ascribe to cases of causation outside of our life, to physical cases also, 
an inwardly experiential nature. In other words, we should have to espouse a so-called ‘pan-psychic’ 
philosophy. (James 1911: 218) 
Similar arguments can also be found with panpsychists such as Schopenhauer (1859/1966), 
Whitehead (1933/1967: 184) and Hartshorne (1954).  
There is also significant historical support for the alleged reductio. Several historical opponents of 
realism about causal powers have claimed that the concept of causal power is irredeemably 
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anthropomorphic or animistic in virtue of being derived from experiences of will or motivation, 
and that realism about causal powers should therefore be rejected (see Hume 1748/1999: §52, fn 
12; Mach 1897; Russell 1912; Collingwood 1937; Mørch forthcoming-a). They thereby endorsed 
the validity of the argument from dispositionalism to panpsychism, even though they denied its 
soundness.  
4.2 Parallel Arguments from Dispositional Properties 
Could there be an argument from dispositionalism to panpsychism that is at least valid? Assuming 
the original arguments from categorical properties are valid, it would seem so. The original 
arguments share the following two premises:  
Categoricalism: All (or most) physical properties are realized by categorical properties.  
Mental Categoricity: The only categorical properties we know or can positively conceive 
of are phenomenal properties.  
Analogous premises can be constructed in terms of dispositional properties:  
Dispositionalism: All (or most) physical properties are realized by fundamentally 
dispositional properties.  
Mental Dispositionality: The only fundamentally dispositional properties we know or can 
positively conceive of are phenomenal properties.  
By fundamentally dispositional properties, I here mean dispositional properties that are not in turn 
realized by categorical properties, as per categoricalism,13 nor realized by pure relations, as per 
                                               
13  The characterization of categoricalism could be understood as implicitly including the same fundamentality 
qualifier. But it seems widely assumed that categorical properties cannot be realized by dispositional properties, in 
which case the qualifier would be redundant.  
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ontic structural realism. I will take fundamentally dispositional properties to include both purely 
dispositional properties and properties that are both categorical and dispositional, as per the 
identity view. 
These premises could form the basis for an argument analogous to the original argument from 
philosophy of mind, according to which we should posit fundamentally dispositional phenomenal 
properties as the realizers of physical properties in order to give them an explanatory role and 
thereby solve the mind-body problem. They could also support an argument analogous to the 
argument from anti-noumenalism, according to which panpsychism offers the only way of 
avoiding noumenalism about the fundamentally dispositional grounds of the physical world.  
If either of these arguments were sound, it would clearly disarm the challenge from 
dispositionalism to the case for panpsychism. But it might seem that this is not the kind of response 
that panpsychists would want to endorse because it would contradict the original arguments from 
categorical properties in important ways. 
First, the claim that phenomenal properties are the only fundamentally dispositional properties we 
know might seem to contradict the original claim that all (or most) physical properties are 
dispositional. But this claim could be understood (and is often seemingly intended) as asserting 
that physical properties are dispositional in the non-fundamental sense of being reducible to 
relations between circumstances and manifestations. That is, the original claim can be understood 
as saying that physics reveals only purely relational or structural properties,14 but no intrinsic or 
non-relational properties of either the categorical or fundamentally dispositional kind. 
                                               
14  This might not seem like much for physics to reveal. But relational properties may include not only logico-
mathematical properties, but also irreducibly spatiotemporal properties and perhaps other fundamental relations (as 
long as these relations are still such as to arguably require intrinsic/non-relational relata, the role of which can be 
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Second, the claim that phenomenal properties are dispositional might seem to contradict the 
original claim that phenomenal properties are categorical. But these two claims are not necessarily 
contradictory either, because according to the identity view, as discussed above, phenomenal 
properties may be both categorical and dispositional. But what if the identity view were shown to 
be incoherent15 or otherwise proven false? If so, then even though panpsychists who endorsed the 
original case from categorical properties would have been wrong to say that phenomenal properties 
are categorical, they would still have been right to say that phenomenal properties are intrinsic 
(given that both categorical and fundamentally dispositional properties are intrinsic). Their mistake 
might therefore only have consisted in conflating the notions of categoricity and intrinsicality, 
which is arguably not a very radical mistake because the distinction between these notions is quite 
subtle.  
The arguments from dispositional properties could therefore be endorsed by proponents of the 
original arguments from categorical properties without contradiction, if they only admit that the 
original arguments contain at best some ambiguity or at worst a non-radical mistake.  
I will now argue that the arguments from dispositional properties may actually be sound. This 
defense will be offered specifically as a response to the challenge from dispositionalism to the 
original arguments from categorical properties. In this context, only the Mental Dispositionality 
claim needs to be defended, because the other parts of the arguments are either (1) implied by 
dispositionalism16 and the Mental Dispositionality premise or (2) identical to parts of the original 
                                               
occupied by phenomenal properties) (see footnote 7). And according to structural realism, an influential position in 
philosophy of science motivated entirely independently of panpsychism (and which comes in both an ontic and a less 
radical epistemic version compatible with panpsychism (see, e.g., Maxwell (1971)), structural knowledge adequately 
accounts for our knowledge of the physical world.  
15 For example, in view of the sort of problem noted in footnote 12 above.  
16 The challenge from dispositionalism obviously presupposes that dispositionalism is true. This does not imply the 
premise labelled Dispositionalism above, which expresses a more restricted version of dispositionalism according to 
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arguments that are unaffected by the challenge. In particular, both the original case for anti-
noumenalism about the realizers of physical properties and the original case that positing 
phenomenal properties as the realizers of physical properties solves the mind–body problem are 
neutral on whether the realizers are categorical or dispositional, and are therefore not affected by 
the challenge. If these parts of the original arguments from categorical properties are sound, the 
corresponding parts of the analogous arguments from dispositional properties would also be.  
I will defend Mental Dispositionality in two steps. First, I will argue that some phenomenal 
properties are, or can be positively conceived of as, fundamentally dispositional. Second, I will 
argue that phenomenal properties are the only fundamentally dispositional properties we know or 
have a positive conception of, because no physical or other non-phenomenal properties qualify.  
5 Defending Mental Dispositionality  
5.1 Marks of the Dispositional 
What are the marks or essential characteristics of fundamental dispositionality? As noted, 
fundamental dispositions can be understood as roughly equivalent to non-Humean causal powers.  
Non-Humean causal powers (henceforth mainly referred to as just powers) are properties in virtue 
of which causes produce or bringing about their effects, or make them happen, and thereby 
metaphysically necessitate them.17 This distinguishes dispositionalism and other forms of realism 
                                               
which physical properties are realized by, but not identical to, fundamentally dispositional properties. Dispositionalism 
broadly construed may take physical properties to be identical to fundamentally dispositional properties (i.e., take 
such properties to be directly revealed by physics). In the context of the present argument, the claim that physical 
properties are not identical to (and thus rather realized by) fundamentally dispositional properties follows from Mental 
Dispositionality, according to which the only fundamentally dispositional properties we know or can positively 
conceive of are phenomenal, and the fact that physics does not include phenomenal properties as fundamental. 
17 At least in the case of deterministic causation. Some hold that causation need not involve necessitation because 
causation can be indeterministic. But it seems indeterministic powers should still necessitate an increase in the 
objective probability of their effects occurring. I will set indeterminism aside for the sake of simplicity, but most of 
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about causal powers from the regularity theory of causation (Hume 1739-40/2000; Lewis 1973), 
according to which causes are merely contingently followed by their effects. Powers should also, 
as discussed, be understood as intrinsic properties. This further distinguishes realism about causal 
powers from the governing laws view of causation (Armstrong 1978), according to which causes 
also necessitate their effects, but in virtue of being connected to them by irreducible laws that are 
extrinsic to the entities they govern. It should also be noted that powers are characteristically 
defeasible: powers only necessitate their effects in absence of interference from other powers (i.e., 
ceteris absentibus).18  
How could powers be experienced or positively conceived of? Hume of course claimed that a true 
experience or conception of causal powers should present causes as inconceivable without their 
effects. He also claimed that all causes are in fact conceivable without their effects—for example, 
we can conceive of one billiard ball colliding with another, but the second one does not move. 
Many realists about causal powers have criticized this conceivability criterion as too strong. But it 
is hard to deny that the criterion would be sufficient—at least if we are talking about ideal 
inconceivability, understood as inconceivability by an ideally rational subject who is fully 
acquainted with the nature of the items she is conceiving of.  
Perhaps there could also be other criteria for experiences or conceptions of causal powers that are 
weaker or less demanding, but still sufficient, so that the conceivability criterion would not be 
necessary. But supposing some phenomenal properties actually did satisfy the conceivability 
                                               
the discussion to follow could be translated to apply to indeterministic views, e.g., instead of claiming that a cause is 
inconceivable without an effect, one could claim it is inconceivable without some objective probability its effect.  
18 It might be complained that the claim “A necessitates B ceteris absentibus” reduces to the truism “A is followed by 
B except when it isn’t”. This might be a problem for reductive analyses of powers, which are committed to defining 
interference in non-dispositional terms. But if dispositions are irreducible, as per dispositionalism, interference can be 
defined in terms of other dispositions or powers, as in “A necessitates B when there are no other powers directed at 
non-B”, which is not a truism.  
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criterion, but no physical properties satisfied it, then even if physical properties still were to satisfy 
some weaker criterion, it would seem reasonable to conclude that our experiences or conceptions 
of physical powers are not as revelatory as our experiences or concepts of phenomenal powers. 
That is, if phenomenal properties satisfy the conceivability criterion but physical properties do not, 
then the physical concepts/experiences should at the very least not be taken to afford us complete 
insight into the nature of dispositionality, given that the kind of insight that enables us to recognize 
necessity by means of inconceivability is in fact available in the phenomenal case. And if our 
conception of physical dispositionality is incomplete, then it must have some hidden aspect, which 
panpsychists may argue is phenomenal (in order to avoid noumenalism or allow phenomenal 
properties an explanatory role, as before). 
Could any mental properties satisfy the conceivability criterion? As seen above, many 
philosophers considering the possibility of mental powers have focused on volitions, i.e., our own 
efforts or attempts at action. Hume considered this proposal at length, and argued that volitions 
and successful actions can conceivably come apart in the case of both physical and mental action, 
just as clearly as physical causes can conceivably come apart from their effects. This seems correct. 
For example, we can easily conceive of someone trying to move their arm, but no movement 
follows. We can also conceive of someone trying to calculate a sum, or recall a memory, but with 
no result (even stipulating the absence of interference). The same seems to hold for any mental 
properties that are intentional in some broader sense (such as thoughts, attitudes, prior intentions 
and so on)—they are also conceivable without their effects. 
But there are also other mental properties besides volitional and intentional properties which seem 
dispositional, namely motivational phenomenal properties such as pain and pleasure. These are 
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properties which Hume did not consider, and which I will now argue may actually pass the 
conceivability criterion.  
5.2 Motivational Phenomenal Properties 
Pain and pleasure appear to cause their effects in a distinctively dispositional or powerful way. 
Intuitively, pain seems to make subjects who experience it try to avoid it, whereas pleasure seems 
to make them try to pursue it. It is also difficult to conceive of pain and pleasure producing 
different, and especially opposite effects, i.e., pain making someone try to pursue it, or pleasure 
making someone try to avoid it. Note that the immediate effects of pain and pleasure are mere 
volitions rather than successful actions, i.e., mere tryings or attempts at avoidance and pursuit 
respectively (understood as mental events). Therefore, even if it is fully conceivable that volitions 
come apart from their effects (i.e., the actions they are aimed at), it may still be inconceivable that 
motivational properties such as pain and pleasure come apart from their effects (i.e. the mere 
volitions they motivate).  
Also note that, like all causal powers, the powers of pain and pleasure would only necessitate, and 
hence should only be inconceivable without, their effects in the absence of interference from other 
motives or reasons (i.e., ceteris absentibus). Otherwise, a necessary connection would be falsified 
by actual as well as merely conceivable cases. Take pain. People of course endure or pursue pain, 
and avoid pleasure, for all kinds of interfering reasons. For example, people may endure pain 
because they believe it will lead to less pain in the future (as when cleaning a wound). They may 
also pursue pain because it leads to a greater pleasure at the same time (as in masochism), or 
because they believe it to be morally right (as with self-punishment). But in the absence of any 
interfering motives, it seems pain always makes subjects try to avoid it, and difficult to conceive 
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otherwise.19 Furthermore, when there are interfering factors causing subjects to, e.g., pursue pain 
(such as a simultaneous or expected greater pleasure) it would not really be the pain that that caused 
this, but rather the interfering factor.  
Even so, one might think it is not impossible to conceive of pain and pleasure having different 
effects, only somewhat difficult or unnatural, and that we can still conceive of it if we really try. 
In response, it may be granted (at least for the sake of the argument) that it may be conceivable 
that pain is regularly contingently followed by something else than avoidance attempts (such as 
pursuit attempts, or indifference), as per the (Humean) regularity theory. It may also be 
conceivable that pain is necessarily connected to something else than avoidance attempts in virtue 
of being constrained by an external law, as per the (Armstrongian) governing laws view. But it 
does not seem conceivable that pain makes subjects try to do anything else than avoid it in virtue 
of its intrinsic character alone, as per dispositionalism—assuming the intrinsic character of pain 
is constituted by its phenomenal character, i.e., what it is like, or how it feels.20 
                                               
19 One possible exception is asymbolic pain which, as discussed by Grahek (2007), does not seems to make subjects 
try to avoid it even in the absence of any interfering motives. In other work (Mørch forthcoming-b, manuscript), I 
argue that this does not refute the phenomenal powers view because evidence suggests that asymbolic pain is 
phenomenologically different form normal pain. In this paper, I use the term pain to refer to phenomenologically 
normal pain and assume that it excludes asymbolic pain.  
20 Dispositionalists could reject the assumption that the intrinsic character of phenomenal properties is constituted by 
their phenomenal character, by disputing that phenomenal character exists at all or that it is intrinsic. But disputing 
this would constitute a distinct objection to the overall case for panpsychism different from the challenge from 
dispositionalism (given that dispositionalism is also fully compatible with phenomenal character existing and being 
intrinsic), which is outside the scope of this paper.  
One might think dispositionalists would still reject the assumption that properties necessitate their effects in 
virtue of their intrinsic character. Rather, they would hold that they just brutely necessitate their effects, and that is all 
there is to them. But if dispositions consist merely in sets of brute necessitation relations it is hard to say what would 
be intrinsic about them, and relatedly, how dispositionalism differs from ontic structural realism. And in any case, the 
“in virtue of” interpretation should at least be regarded as a valid version of dispositionalism. If phenomenal properties 
are inconceivable without their effects given this version, it supports (if the arguments I will offer below are correct) 
that phenomenal properties are dispositional in the sense of this version. 
Another worry is that dispositionalism may seem to imply that the intrinsic character of properties should be 
fully capturable by dispositional concepts, understood as concepts that that pick properties out only in terms of their 
effects or manifestations and circumstances. But according to Russellian panpsychism, phenomenal character cannot 
be captured in dispositional terms (if so, the epistemic gap from physical to phenomenal properties should be easily 
closable, assuming that dispositional descriptions qualify as physical descriptions). Therefore, to say that the intrinsic 
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To support this, try to imagine a painful experience, such as stepping on a sharp nail, as vividly as 
possible in terms of how it feels. The phenomenal character of such an experience can only be 
described as intrinsically disagreeable and repulsive. How could such an experience make 
someone try do anything else than avoid it solely in virtue of feeling like that? Correspondingly, 
the phenomenal character of pleasure can only be described as intrinsically agreeable and 
attractive. How could it make subjects try to do anything else than try to pursue it solely in virtue 
of feeling like that? It seems someone who conceives of pain and pleasure as having different 
effects in virtue of how they feel must either not know (or fail to vividly imagine or remember) 
how they feel, or implicitly assume that their effects do not derive from how they feel. To assume 
that their effects do not derive from how they feel is equivalent to denying dispositionalism (about 
phenomenal properties) in favor of the governing laws view or the regularity theory, or 
alternatively, in favor of epiphenomenalism, the view that phenomenal properties have no effects 
at all (in the sense of any theory of causation). 
This seems to show that pain and pleasure necessitate their effects assuming dispositionalism is 
true (and the absence of interference). But the precise significance of this might not be very 
obvious. Prima facie, it might seem to only reflect the analytic or tautological truth that if 
dispositionalism is true, then (by definition) all properties necessitate their actual effects. But the 
                                               
character of phenomenal properties is constituted by their phenomenal character would be incompatible with either 
dispositionalism (assuming phenomenal character cannot be captured in dispositional terms) or Russellian monism 
(assuming it can be captured in dispositional terms). A further problem is that if phenomenal character could be fully 
captured in dispositional terms that pick it out in terms of its actual effects, it would follow trivially or analytically 
that it could not have different effects. And inconceivability in virtue of analyticity is not an indicator of causal 
necessity of the kind involved in fundamental dispositionality.  
But dispositionalism does not imply that the intrinsic character of properties should be fully capturable by 
dispositional concepts (as defined above). First of all, if dispositions are regarded as that in virtue of which properties 
necessitate their effects, it would seem that concepts that only specify that they necessitate particular effects could not 
capture their full nature. Second, if the identity view is correct, dispositions should also have a categorical or 
qualitative aspect that should also not be capturable in dispositional terms. Non-dispositional concepts of phenomenal 
properties could therefore be regarded as capturing one or both of these aspects of the intrinsic character of phenomenal 
properties, assuming they are dispositional.  
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inconceivability only depends on the general assumption that pain and pleasure necessitate some 
effects or other in virtue of their phenomenal character. This renders it inconceivable that they do 
not necessitate avoidance and pursuit attempts specifically. It is not analytically true that if pain 
and pleasure necessitate some effects, then they necessitate any particular effects such as avoidance 
or pursuit attempts.  
But neither could it show that pain and pleasure actually necessitate their effects, given that it 
seems conceivable and thereby possible that the antecedent assumption of dispositionalism is false. 
What it does seem to show, though, is that we are able to understand how pain and pleasure would 
be capable of necessitating their effects, or what it is about them in virtue of which they would 
necessitate their effects, if they were to do so. Given that we have a positive conception of the 
phenomenal character of pain and pleasure, it also shows that we have a positive conception of 
that in virtue of which they would necessitate their effects. This is enough to support the Mental 
Dispositionality premise, i.e., the claim that some phenomenal properties are known to be or 
positively conceivable as fundamentally dispositional, by supporting the disjunct of positive 
conceivability.  
Furthermore, in the context where this premise is part of a response to the challenge from 
dispositionalism, there is also support for the other disjunct that some phenomenal properties are 
known to be (as opposed to merely positively conceivable as) fundamentally dispositional. The 
challenge presupposes that dispositionalism is true, and from this it follows that pain and pleasure 
actually necessitate their effects in virtue of their phenomenal character.  
One might object that the inconceivability must rely on implicitly considering pain under 
dispositional concepts, understood as concepts that pick them out in terms of their particular effects 
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or manifestations, e.g., conceiving of pain as “the disposition of making subjects attempt 
avoidance” and pleasure as “the disposition of making subjects attempt pursuit”. If so, their 
particular effects would follow analytically after all.21 Such an analytic connection would merely 
reflect a logical connection between our concepts of pain and pleasure and their effects, rather than 
a necessary connection between these properties themselves. Or alternatively, it may reflect a mere 
constitutive relation between dispositions and manifestations, implied by conceiving of 
dispositions as constituted by relations to particular manifestations, rather than a causal relation 
between dispositions and their manifestations conceived of as distinct properties. 
But the conceivability also arises when conceiving of pain and pleasure under phenomenal 
concepts that pick them out demonstratively in terms of how they feel, or what they are like from 
the first-person perspective. Phenomenal concepts are not dispositional nor otherwise logically 
connected to concepts of any particular effects: there is no logical connection between the concept 
of “feeling like this”—when pointing to an occurrent experience, or vivid memory, of pain or 
pleasure—and the concept of an avoidance or pursuit attempt. 22 But it still seems inconceivable 
that pain should cause anything else than avoidance attempts in virtue of feeling like this—and 
                                               
21 One might also think pain and pleasure must be conceived of in purely dispositional terms given dispositionalism, 
but as discussed in footnote 20 above, dispositionalism (or at least some versions of it) also allows that dispositions 
have (intrinsic and/or categorical) aspects that are not captured in dispositional terms (that pick them out by their 
effects and triggering circumstances alone), and in terms of which non-dispositional concepts could therefore 
successfully refer to them. 
22 Note that even if there is no logical connection between purely phenomenal concepts of pain and pleasure and their 
respective effects, there could still be a conceptual connection in a broader sense, because phenomenal concepts are 
arguably constituted by the phenomenal properties they refer to (or faint “Humean copies” thereof) (Chalmers 2010: 
265-266, 272). If there is a necessary connection between pain and avoidance attempts, and the concept of pain is 
constituted by (a Humean copy of) pain, there will also be a necessary connection between the concept of pain and 
avoidance attempts. But this sort of conceptual connection presupposes a necessary causal connection between the 
properties themselves, and so cannot be used to explain the appearance of a causal connection away as merely 
conceptual. 
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vice versa for pleasure. The inconceivability thereby supports that pain and pleasure necessitate 
their effects in a properly causal way, in virtue of their own phenomenal character.23 
To summarize: it seems inconceivable that pain and pleasure fail to necessitate avoidance and 
pursuit attempts respectively, assuming they necessitate some effects in virtue of their intrinsic, 
phenomenal character. This inconceivability does not reflect a mere analytic truth: first, because 
the assumption that pain and pleasure necessitate some effects in virtue of their phenomenal 
character is logically compatible with them necessitating any particular effects; second, because 
the inconceivability also arises when conceiving of pain and pleasure in purely phenomenal terms 
that are not logically connected to the concepts of avoidance or pursuit attempts. The 
inconceivability therefore suggests that we can positively conceive of pain and pleasure as 
fundamentally dispositional, i.e., that we can understand in concrete, substantive detail how they 
would be capable of necessitating their effects. In the context of offering a response to the 
challenge from dispositionalism against the case for panpsychism, the assumption that these 
properties actually necessitate some effects in virtue of their intrinsic character, which the 
inconceivability depends on, can be taken for granted. This implies that they are actually and thus 
knowably fundamentally dispositional. 24 
                                               
23 A related objection would be that the inconceivability must derive from implicitly assuming a kind of analytic 
functionalism about pain and pleasure, according to which they must be considered under functional concepts, which 
would also pick them out in terms of their effects, but without specifying that they must be produced in a 
dispositionalist way. But if the inconceivability also follows from conceiving pain and pleasure under phenomenal 
concepts, it refutes this objection as well, because phenomenal concepts are both non-dispositional and non-functional. 
24 At this point, one might wonder whether the same kind of argument could support that volitions (or other intentional 
properties) could also be known or positively conceived of as fundamentally dispositional—because it might seem 
harder to conceive of volitions coming apart from the actions they are directed given the assumption that they 
necessitate some effects in virtue of their phenomenal character. Perhaps, but such an argument would not be entirely 
analogous. First of all, it is more difficult to get a firm grasp of volitions in purely phenomenal, completely non-
dispositional or non-functional terms (that define them in terms of the particular actions they are aimed at) and thereby 
more difficult to demonstrate causal as opposed to merely analytic (or constitutive) necessity. Second, volitions are 
not universally recognized as phenomenal or even mental. As noted above, it has been denied that intentionality is a 
mark of the mental (but rather a mark of the dispositional), and one might think volitions are purely intentional and 
not phenomenal (although it has been argued that intentionality is essentially phenomenal, as per the so-called 
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5.3 Non-Phenomenal Properties 
To establish the Mental Dispositionality premise, it must also be shown that phenomenal properties 
are the only fundamentally dispositional properties we know or can positively conceive of. When 
it comes to non-phenomenal properties known from either everyday experience or physics, it 
seems they all fail the conceivability criterion. For example, it seems we can easily conceive of 
solid objects, such as two billiard balls, passing through each other on impact (rather than the first 
making the second one move), or negatively charged entities, such as two electrons, attracting each 
other (rather than repelling each other), even assuming dispositionalism is true (and the absence 
of interference).  
One might object that, according to dispositionalism, solidity is a dispositional property that 
essentially manifests as not passing through other solid objects on impact, and negative charge is 
a dispositional property that essentially manifests as repulsion of other negative charged particles, 
and so on. Therefore, these scenarios are implicitly logically incoherent and hence inconceivable. 
But the scenarios would only be logically incoherent if solidity and charge are conceived of in 
dispositional terms, i.e., under concepts that pick them out in terms of their actual manifestations 
or effects. If solidity is conceived of under a non-dispositional concept that picks it out, for 
example, in terms of how it looks or feels, it would be fully logically coherent and conceivable 
                                               
phenomenal intentionality thesis (see Bourget and Mendelovici 2016), and also that volition is necessarily 
accompanied by a distinct kind of phenomenology (Horgan et al. 2003; Ginet 1997)). In contrast, pain and pleasure 
are phenomenal properties, and even granted that intentionality may not be a mark of a mental, it is hard to deny that 
phenomenology is (and denying this would in any case be futile for the purpose of blocking an argument for 
panpsychism understood as the view the all things involve phenomenal properties, but not necessarily mental 
properties in any other sense). For these reasons, the Mental Dispositionality premise seems at least more easily 
defensible in terms of motivational properties and their relation to volitions than in terms of volitions and their relation 
to actions (or other intentional properties and their relations to their effects, which would have the same problems as 
volitions). 
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that solid objects pass through other solid objects—even assuming that the property picked out in 
this way is (a posteriori) identical with some (unspecified) disposition.  
When it comes to charge, however, we might not be in possession of any non-dispositional 
concept25 that does not implicitly pick it out in terms of its manifestations or effects—because we 
might not have a way of picking out unobservable properties except in terms of the dispositional 
or theoretical role they are posited to play. But in that case—as well as in the case where solidity 
is conceived of in dispositional terms—the inconceivability would reflect a mere logical relation 
between concepts, or alternatively, a constitutive connection between a dispositional property, 
considered as constituted by relations to its particular effects, and its effects, rather than a causal 
connection between distinct properties.  
According to the conceivability criterion—whose validity is confirmed by the fact that it can 
actually be satisfied (conditional on dispositionalism) by phenomenal properties—this would show 
that there are no physical fundamentally dispositional properties—in the strict sense of “physical” 
as being fully revealed by physics.26 But one might think there could still be non-phenomenal or 
neutral, i.e., neither physical nor phenomenal, fundamentally dispositional properties.   
Could we form a positive conception of neutral dispositions or powers? Many hold that we have 
an innate, primitive concept of causal power that is prior to physical experience (perhaps in some 
broadly Kantian sense). But even if there is such a concept, it would not necessarily offer us a 
                                               
25 Or at least non-functional concept (discussed in footnote 23 above), which picks its out in terms of its effects or 
theoretical role, but without presupposing a dispositionalist ontology. 
26 It might seem extreme to conclude that fundamental dispositions would not be physical based on the conceivability 
criterion alone. But under the current strict definition of the physical as fully revealed by physics, it should not be that 
controversial, unless one takes the regularity theory and realism about laws to be incompatible with physics, i.e., 
directly refuted by the straightforward empirical discovery of irreducible causal powers. Also note that dispositions 
could still be physical by the other common definition of the physical as non-mental (see footnote 3) (though not 
positively conceivable as non-mental, if my arguments below are successful).  
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grasp of the nature of any particular powers. When it comes to physical properties, as just argued, 
it seems conceivable that they have any particular power assuming that they have some power 
(again, unless conceived of in dispositional terms), and the assumption that they have some power 
could be understood in terms of a primitive concept of causal power. This can be taken to show 
that we have no positive conception of how any particular physical properties are capable of 
satisfying the primitive concept of power. The question for proponents of neutral powers, 
therefore, is not whether we have a primitive concept of causal power in general (i.e., the property 
of intrinsically necessitating one’s effects, whatever they may be) that does not imply mentality. 
Rather, the question is whether there are any particular neutral properties that can be positively 
conceived of as necessitating any particular effects, in virtue of being inconceivable without some 
particular effects, assuming they satisfy the (perhaps) primitive concept of causal power. 
It is already unclear whether we are able to positively conceive of any particular neutral properties 
of any sort (with the possible exception of purely structural or abstract properties), given that 
neutral properties are not revealed by physics (by their definition as non-physical). It may be 
suggested that we have innate, primitive concepts of them, but this is hard to demonstrate. It would 
be even harder to demonstrate that we have primitive concepts of particular properties that are not 
only neutral, but also necessarily connected to other particular properties.  
One might think that we could derive a positive conception of neutral powers from our conception 
of phenomenal powers by abstracting away the phenomenal aspects of phenomenal powers. But 
it is unclear how this could work. In general, abstraction is an operation that yields abstract 
structure. Causal powers are concrete and intrinsic, and so could not be positively conceived of in 
abstract, structural terms. Alternatively, abstraction might be understood as a process of 
subtracting away inessential elements or aspects of things. But for phenomenal properties, it is 
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hard to discern any non-phenomenal elements or aspects at all (besides structural ones). By 
abstracting away their phenomenal aspects, then, we would seem to be left only with a purely 
negative conception of “some properties that are not phenomenal, but necessitate particular effects 
in the same way phenomenal properties do”, i.e., a conception that only specifies a theoretical role.  
However, it has also been argued that phenomenal properties do have non-phenomenal elements 
or aspects. Coleman (2013) argues that phenomenal properties have a qualitative and a subjective 
component which can come apart. On this view, phenomenal properties consist of purely 
qualitative properties which are not necessarily experienced by a subject, but become experienced 
and thereby come to constitute a phenomenal property when entering into appropriate relations 
(along the lines of the Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness). If the qualitative and 
subjective aspects of phenomenal properties can be distinguished in this or some other way, and 
subjectivity is necessary for phenomenality, then perhaps by abstracting away from the subjective, 
experienced aspect of pain and pleasure we can arrive at a positive conception of particular non-
phenomenal powers as unexperienced versions of these qualities? 
In response to this, some would deny that unexperienced qualities are positively or even coherently 
conceivable. But even granted (for the sake of the argument) that they are, they would not seem 
dispositional in the same way as experienced, phenomenal properties—because it does not seem 
inconceivable that unexperienced pain and pleasure should fail to motivate avoidance or pursuit 
attempts (in virtue of their intrinsic and qualitative, but not phenomenal, character). Rather, it 
seems fully conceivable—and perhaps even to be expected—that unexperienced qualities would 
just be ignored by their subjects or otherwise cause something else. Therefore, by abstracting away 
the subjective aspect of phenomenal properties from their qualitative aspect, one would also 
abstract away what allows us to positively conceive of them as powerful.  
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6 Further Objections 
6.1 Perception of Dispositionality  
One might object that, even granted that our experiences of pain and pleasure are experiences of 
dispositionality, this does not imply the dispositionality itself is not phenomenal, because 
experiences of pain and pleasure can be understood as a kind of perception of dispositionality. In 
ordinary perception, a physical object, such as an apple, can be perceived via a phenomenal 
representation, such as a visual image of the apple, without this implying that the apple itself is 
phenomenal. In the same way, one might think dispositions can be perceived via pain and pleasure 
phenomenology without this implying that the dispositions themselves are phenomenal. Or, in the 
same way as perceivable physical objects can exist without actually being perceived, the 
dispositions associated with pain and pleasure can also exist unexperienced and unaccompanied 
by any phenomenology.  
Note that this suggestion is different from the view that phenomenal properties have a subjective 
and a qualitative element, and that the qualitative element can be conceived of as powerful apart 
from the subjective one, as already discussed above. Here, the suggestion is that the entire 
phenomenal property, including both the qualitative and subjective aspects of it (if any such 
aspects are separable), comes apart from a wholly distinct dispositional property that the 
phenomenal property represents.  
But this suggestion still faces a similar problem, namely that when we conceive of dispositionality 
via pain and pleasure, these phenomenal properties do not merely play the role of representing 
dispositionality. They are rather part of the content that is being represented, because the necessary 
connections between pain and pleasure and their effects seem to hold in virtue of their 
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phenomenology, or because of how they feel. Their phenomenology thereby seems to instantiate 
or ground their dispositionality rather than merely represent it. Therefore, if they were no longer 
associated with phenomenology, they would no longer be associated with anything (positively 
conceivable as) dispositional. Unlike perceptual objects as we ordinarily conceive of them, the 
dispositionality of pain and pleasure would therefore be inseparable from the phenomenology by 
which we experience them.  
6.2 The Conceivability of No Powers 
I have argued that it is inconceivable that pain and pleasure fail to necessitate avoidance and pursuit 
attempts respectively, assuming they (intrinsically) necessitate some effects. But I have also 
granted (at least for the sake of the argument) that it may be conceivable that pain and pleasure do 
not (intrinsically) necessitate anything, i.e., that the regularity theory, the governing laws view or 
epiphenomenalism is true. If conceivability implies possibility, it follows that it is also possible 
that they do not necessitate anything. And one might think that if pain and pleasure necessitate 
their effects, they must necessarily necessitate them (i.e., necessitate them in all possible worlds). 
One response to this problem is that it is only ideal conceivability, i.e., conceivability by an ideal 
reasoner who is fully acquainted with all relevant aspects of the items conceived of, that implies 
possibility, and it might not be ideally conceivable that pain and pleasure do not (intrinsically) 
necessitate anything. The fact that we can actually conceive of it must therefore mean that we 
either fail to reason ideally about pain and pleasure, or are not acquainted with all their relevant 
aspects. Both options seem coherent. On the one hand, it could be supposed that an ideal 
phenomenological reasoner would not be able to conceive of pain and pleasure having no powers 
while remaining phenomenally identical, or still feeling exactly the same. For example, perhaps 
on ideal phenomenological reflection the phenomenal painfulness or hurtfulness of pain is not 
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conceivable except as a real power and thus pain could not ideally conceivably fail to cause 
avoidance attempts (ceteris absentibus) no matter what. On the other hand, it could be supposed 
that pain and pleasure have some non-phenomenal aspects to their nature that we are not fully 
acquainted with, and which determine whether they really necessitate their effects in the way they 
seem capable of. This part of their nature is only knowable indirectly from further arguments (such 
as general arguments for dispositionalism or realism about causal powers).  
One might worry that admitting that we may not be fully acquainted with or able to reason ideally 
about phenomenal properties undermines the conceivability argument against physicalism (Kripke 
1980; Chalmers 1996), an important component of the problem of the epistemic gap that is 
presupposed by the argument for panpsychism from philosophy of mind (including the present 
version in terms of dispositional properties). But it is coherent to suppose that we are fully 
acquainted with and/or able to reason ideally about those aspects of phenomenal properties that 
rule out that they are identifiable with physical properties, but at the same time not fully acquainted 
with and/or able to reason ideally about those aspects that imply that they are powerful. 
7 Summary and Conclusion 
The case for panpsychism, according to which phenomenal properties should be posited as the 
categorical grounds of physical dispositions—in order to solve the mind-body problem and/or in 
order to avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world—faces a challenge from 
dispositionalism. According to dispositionalism, dispositions are irreducible powers with no need 
for categorical grounds. I have shown that this challenge cannot be easily refuted by arguments 
aimed at preserving categoricalism. But it could be countered by an argument that dispositionalism 
entails panpsychism.  
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Such an argument may be based on the following two premises:  
Dispositionalism: All (or most) physical properties are realized by fundamentally 
dispositional properties.  
Mental Dispositionality: The only fundamentally dispositional properties we know or can 
positively conceive of are phenomenal properties.  
These premises can be combined with premises from the original arguments from categorical 
properties to yield a parallel set of arguments from dispositional properties. First, a parallel 
argument from philosophy of mind, according to which positing phenomenal properties as the 
fundamentally dispositional realizers of physical properties (i.e., as the causal powers, or perhaps 
powerful qualities, that ground physical relations) gives them an explanatory role that is 
compatible with them being fundamental, does not violate physical causal closure, and does not 
imply overdetermination. Second, a parallel argument from anti-noumenalism, according to which 
the fundamentally dispositional properties we should take to realize physical properties can only 
be positively conceived of as phenomenal, and—for reasons of either simplicity or methodology—
we should not posit properties that are not positively conceivable to play this role when 
panpsychism offers an adequate positive alternative.  
I have offered a defense of Mental Dispositionality—the claim that phenomenal properties are the 
only fundamentally dispositional properties we know or can positively conceive of—according to 
which motivational phenomenal properties, such as pain and pleasure (conceived of in purely 
phenomenal, non-dispositional terms), cannot conceivably fail to cause their particular effects of 
avoidance or pursuit attempts respectively, assuming dispositionalism is true (and the absence of 
interference). I have argued that this shows that we can positively conceive of these phenomenal 
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properties as fundamentally dispositional. Furthermore, the challenge from dispositionalism 
implies that the antecedent assumption of dispositionalism is true, from which it follows that these 
phenomenal properties are actually and thus knowably fundamentally dispositional.  
I have also argued that no physical or otherwise non-phenomenal (i.e., neutral) properties are 
inconceivable without some particular effects even assuming dispositionalism is true. The 
conceivability criterion of causal necessity seems sufficient, and given that phenomenal properties 
do satisfy the conceivability criterion, it is hard to see why it should not be necessary also for non-
phenomenal properties. If all this is correct, it establishes Mental Dispositionality.  
For the dialectical purpose of refuting the challenge from dispositionalism, Mental Dispositionality 
is the only premise of the arguments from dispositionalism to panpsychism that needs to be 
defended, because the other premises already form part of the original case for panpsychism and 
are not challenged by dispositionalism. For an independent argument from dispositionalism to 
panpsychism, one would have to include a fuller defense of at least one of these further original 
premises, i.e., either the premise the only (or at least best) way of solving the mind–body problem 
is to posit phenomenal properties as the realizers of physical properties or the premise that the 
realizers of physical properties are not noumenal.  
As noted, the view of phenomenal causation on the basis of which I have supported Mental 
Dispositionality, the phenomenal powers view, has implications for many other issues beyond this, 
which I explore in other work—along with further details and objections I have not gone into here.  
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